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Abstract
This paper studies two player stopping games in a discrete time multiple prior
framework with a finite time horizon. Optimal stopping times as well as recursive
formulas for the value processes of the games are derived. These results are used
to characterize the set of no-arbitrage prices for a game option. The notion of a
no-arbitrage price for a game option is based on the idea to consider the payoff
for fixed stopping times as an European option.
Keywords Dynkin games, multiple priors, game options, incomplete Markets.
1 Introduction
Game options are a class of financial contracts which extend the class of American op-
tions. Like in the case of an American option the buyer of a game option has the right
to exercise the contract at any time. But in addition also the seller of the game option
has the right to cancel the contract (i.e. forcing the buyer to exercise it) at any time.
Intuitively it is clear that if it is favorable for the buyer to not exercise the contract, it
should be favorable for the seller to cancel the contract and vice versa. So the contract
should be exercised or cancelled immediately. For this reason game options usually
include a certain penalty that the seller has to pay to the buyer in addition to the obli-
gations of the financial contract, if the seller cancels the contract. If this penalty is high
enough the seller will not cancel the contract at all and the option can be considered
as an American option.
From a mathematical point of view game options correspond to the concept of two
player stopping games. In a two player stopping game there are given two processes
of which one dominates the other and both players choose a stopping time as their
strategy. The game ends whenever a player stops. At that time Player 1 pays Player 2
an amount based on the higher process if Player 1 stopped first and if Player 2 stopped
first, the amount Player 1 pays to Player 2 is based on the lower process. In the case of
game options Player 1 is the seller and Player 2 is the buyer. The difference between the
processes is the penalty that the seller has to pay in order to cancel the contract. Since
in a stopping game Player 1 tries to minimize the expected payoff and Player 2 tries to
maximize it, there is a minimax and maximin value for the game which are called upper
and lower values. Typically, if a stopping game is considered the first step is to show
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that upper and lower values coincide which implies that the game has a value. After
that optimal stopping times for both players are of interest. A stopping time for Player
1 (resp. Player 2) is considered to be optimal, if the expected payoff with this stopping
time is less (resp. greater) or equal to the game value, no matter what stopping time
Player 2 (resp. Player 1) chooses.
In 1969 Dynkin extended the optimal stopping theory which was initiated in (Snell
1952) by considering a two player stopping game. For this reason stopping games
are also referred to as Dynkin games. The results of Dynkin were developed further
in (Neveu 1975) and (Ohtsubo 1986). The first connection between Dynkin games
and financial options was made in (Kifer 2000) by the introduction of game options,
which are also often called Israeli options, in the binomial model and the Black-Scholes
model. Kifer derived optimal stopping times for the buyer and the seller and a cheapest
superhedge for the seller against a game option. Since then Dynkin games as well as
game options have been studied in a wide range of different models and applications.
In (Kifer 2013a) there is given an extensive overview about different results for Dynkin
games and game options and the corresponding literature.
Knightian uncertainty describes the distinction between the terms "risk" and "un-
certainty". In general the term risk is used if the randomness of a situation can be de-
scribed by a single probability measure and if this is not the case the term uncertainty
is used. For example if we consider optimal stopping problems, it is possible that the
agent is unsure about the distribution of the payoff process. To account for this situa-
tion a common way in the literature is to conisder a multiple prior framework. There
the uncertainty is modelled by a set of probability measures which includes all proba-
bility measures the agent thinks could describe the distribution of the payoff process.
Such a set is called a set of priors. It is then assumed that the agent tries to maximize the
worst case expectation which leads to a stopping problem under a nonlinear operator.
An axiomatic foundation for multiple prior expected utility was given in (Gilboa
and Schmeidler 1989) and extended to an intertemporal setting in
(Epstein and Schneider 2003). In (Riedel 2009) the classical optimal stopping theory as
well as the classical martingale theory was extended to multiple prior frameworks.
In this paper we consider at first a Dynkin game which is inspired by the payoff of
game options in a multiple prior framework. We consider a discrete time model with
a finite time horizon which is similar to the multiple prior model in (Riedel 2009). The
approach will be to consider the worst case scenarios of seller and buyer separately
which leads to two stopping games under nonlinear expectations. We show that these
stopping games have a value and obtain optimal stopping times as well as recursive
formulas for the value processes. After that game options are considered in incomplete
financial markets. We consider a general discrete time financial market model which
is taken from (Föllmer and Schied 2016). In incomplete financial markets we are in
a multiple prior framework where the set of priors is given by the set of equivalent
martingale measures. After defining the notion of no-arbitrage prices for game options
in an incomplete market, superhedging strategies for the seller and for the buyer are
considered. The idea to derive the notion of no-arbitrage prices will be to consider the
payoff of a game option for fixed stopping times as an European option. With the help
of the results obtained for the worst case stopping games we derive that there exists a
cheapest superhedge for the seller and a most expensive superhedge for the buyer and
that the prices of these superhedges coincide with the bounds of the set of no-arbitrage
prices.
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The stopping game we consider in a multiple prior framework has to the best of my
knowledge not been studied yet. There are some works on Dynkin games under Knigh-
tian uncertainty in continuous time frameworks, we mention (Yin 2012), (Koo, Tang,
and Yang 2015) and (Bayraktar and Yao 2017) here. Due to the continuous time frame-
work considered in these papers their approaches and arguments differ a lot from the
discrete time Dynkin game we consider in this paper. Also in a continuous time frame-
work (Dumitrescu, Quenez, and Sulem 2017) considered game options in imperfect
markets and also incorporated the possibility of default in their model. They stud-
ied superhedging strategies for the seller and showed that the price of the cheapest
superhedge for the seller corresponds to the value of a Dynkin game under nonlin-
ear expectations. In a discrete time framework (Dolinsky 2014) studied game options
under volatility uncertainty and obtained a duality theorem for the price of the cheap-
est superhedge for the seller. Dolinsky considered a financial market model without
a probabilistic structure. Hence the model and arguments differ from this paper. The
approach of game options in incomplete markets in this paper extends the approach
for American options in incomplete markets of (Föllmer and Schied 2016). This ex-
tension is also, to the best of my knowledge, new. In (Kühn 2004) and (Kallsen and
Kühn 2004) game options were considered in incomplete markets and their approach
was to use utility maximization. In (Kallsen and Kühn 2004) there was also made a
neutral valuation approach which led to a replacement of the unique equivalent mar-
tingale measure in a complete market by a neutral pricing measure. There are further
papers which deal with game options in incomplete markets. In (Kifer 2013b) game op-
tions are considered in a discrete market model with transaction costs. Kifer derives a
cheapest superhedge for the seller and a most expensive superhedge for the buyer and
a representation for the corresponding prices which includes the notion of random-
ized stopping times. In continuous time (Kallsen and Kühn 2005) define the notion of
no-arbitrage prices by superhedging and obtain a duality theorem for the cheapest su-
perhedging price for the seller which looks similar to the one we obtain in this paper,
but by other arguments. In (Dolinsky and Kifer 2007) there is derived a representa-
tion of the price of the cheapest superhedge for the seller in multinomial models. This
representation coincides with the more general one of this paper and also the general
structure of the proof is quite similar. However the proof in (Dolinsky and Kifer 2007)
heavily relies on the finite probability space one has in a multinomial model, by using
the fact that the infimum over a finite set of stopping times is always attained. Instead
of this argument we will use the results we obtain for the Dynkin game under Knightian
uncertainty. Moreover we derive a duality result for the price representation as well as
an explicit stopping time for the cheapest superhedge for the seller.
This paper is structured in the following way. The main results are provided in Sec-
tion 2 and Section 3. In Section 2 a two player stopping game is solved in a multiple
prior framework. Section 3 consideres game options in incomplete financial markets.
The proofs of the main results are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The Ap-
pendix contains a section about the theory of multiple prior conditional expectations.
2 A Two Player Stopping Game with Multiple Priors
Let (Ω,F ,P0) be a probability space equipped with a filtration (Ft )t=0,...,T such that
F0 = {;,Ω}⊆F1 ⊆ . . .⊆FT =F ,
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where T ∈N denotes a finite time horizon. We consider a two player stopping game be-
tween a buyer and a seller. The potential payoffs are modelled by nonnegative adapted
processes (Yt )t=0,...,T , (Zt )t=0,...,T with Yt É Zt for all t = 0, . . . ,T . Both, buyer and seller
choose a stopping time out of the set
T0 := {τ :Ω→ {0, . . . ,T } : τ stopping time}.
If the buyer chooses the stopping time τ ∈T0 and the seller chooses the stopping time
σ ∈T0, the seller has to pay the buyer the following payoff at time σ∧τ:
R(σ,τ) := 1{σ<τ}Zσ+ 1{σÊτ}Yτ.
We consider the case of Knightian uncertainty which means that the distribution of
the payoff processes is not exactly known to the buyer and the seller. To account for
this uncertainty, we consider a multiple prior framework and use two nonempty sets
of probability measures on (Ω,F ): Qb which denotes the set of priors for the buyer
and Qs which denotes the set of priors for the seller. We consider the possibility of
different sets of priors for buyer and seller to allow the possibility that buyer and seller
have different information about the distribution of the payoffs. In addition to that
we assume that the buyer has no information about the set of priors of the seller and
vice versa. As the buyer tries to maximize the expected payoff and the seller tries to
minimize it, we have different worst case scenarios for seller and buyer (even if Qb =
Qs). Our approach will be to consider two stopping games, one for the worst case of
the buyer and the other for the worst case of the seller.
As the buyer has no information about the set of priors of the seller, the buyer has to
assume that in the worst case the seller chooses a stopping time that minimizes the
expected worst case payoff of the buyer. Hence, in the worst case of the buyer, we have
a two player stopping game with upper value
inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)]
and lower value
sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
inf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)].
With the same argument we consider for the worst case of the seller a two player stop-
ping game with upper value
inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
sup
P∈Qs
EP [R(σ,τ)]
and lower value
sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
sup
P∈Qs
EP [R(σ,τ)].
LetQ 6= ; be a set of probability measures on (Ω,F ). We define
XQ := {X ∈L 0(Ω,F ,P0) : lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
EP [|X |1{|X |Êc}]= 0}
as the set of all Q-uniformly integrable random variables. We make the following as-
sumptions on the payoff processes and sets of priors.
Assumption 2.1. (i) Yt , Zt ∈XQb and Yt , Zt ∈XQs for all t = 0, . . . ,T .
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(ii) P ∼ P0 ∼Q for all P ∈Qb and for all Q ∈Qs .
(iii) Qb andQs are time-consistent
1.
Assumption 2.1(ii) economically means that buyer and seller know which events
can occur and which not. Time-consistency of the setQb makes sure that if the buyer
considers a measure P ∈Qb until some stopping time τ ∈T and shifts to another mea-
sure Q ∈Qb afterwards, there exists a measure R ∈Qb which describes this behavior 2.
Assumption 2.1(i) makes sure that upper and lower values of both stopping games are
well defined.
The following theorems solve the stopping games. We will see that upper and lower
values coincide and obtain optimal stopping times for buyer and seller as well as re-
cursive formulas for the value processes of the stopping games. We define for all t =
1, . . . ,T ,Tt := {τ ∈T0 : τÊ t }. We start with the worst case scenario of the buyer.
Theorem 2.2. Define (W ↓t )t=0,...,T recursively by
W ↓T = YT ,
W ↓t =min(Zt ,max(Yt ,essinfP∈Qb E
P [W ↓t+1|Ft ])) for t = 0, . . . ,T −1
and define for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
σ↓t := inf{s Ê t : W ↓s = Zs}∧T,
τ↓t := inf{s Ê t : W ↓s = Ys}.
Then σ↓t ,τ
↓
t ∈Tt ,
W ↓t = essinf
σ∈Tt
esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ]
= esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
σ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ],
and
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ↓t ,τ)|Ft ]ÉW ↓t É essinfP∈Qb E
P [R(σ,τ↓t )|Ft ], ∀σ,τ ∈Tt . (1)
We conclude by solving the stopping game which arises by considering the worst
case scenario of the seller.
Theorem 2.3. Define ((W ↑t )t=0,...,T ) recursively by
W ↑T = YT ,
W ↑t =min(Zt ,max(Yt ,esssup
P∈Qs
EP [W ↑t+1|Ft ])) for t = 0, . . . ,T −1
1The multiple prior framework we consider in this section is taken from (Riedel 2009), except that we
drop some weak compactness assumption. In the Appendix the assumptions we make are characterized
in detail.
2See (Riedel 2009) for a detailed interpretation of the time-consistency property for a set of priors.
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and define for all t = 0, . . . ,T
σ↑t := inf{s Ê t : W ↑s = Zs}∧T,
τ↑t := inf{s Ê t : W ↑s = Ys}.
Then σ↑t ,τ
↑
t ∈Tt ,
W ↑t = essinf
σ∈Tt
esssup
τ∈Tt
esssup
P∈Qs
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ]
= esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
σ∈Tt
esssup
P∈Qs
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ],
and
esssup
P∈Qs
EP [R(σ↑t ,τ)|Ft ]ÉW ↑t É esssup
P∈Qs
EP [R(σ,τ↑t )|Ft ], ∀σ,τ ∈Tt .
3 Game Options in Incomplete Markets
Let (Ω,F ,P ) be a probability space equipped with a filtration (Ft )t=0,...,T such that
F0 = {;,Ω}⊆F1 ⊆ . . .⊆FT =F ,
where T ∈N denotes a finite time horizon. We consider a financial market 3 with D+1
assets: one riskless asset which price is modelled by the process
S0t := (1+ r )t , t = 0, . . . ,T,
where r Ê 0 denotes a constant interest rate, and D risky assets which prices are mod-
elled by nonnegative, adapted processes (Sdt )t=0,...,T , d = 1, . . . ,D .
S˜dt := (1+ r )−t Sdt , t = 0, . . . ,T,
denotes the discounted price process of asset d ∈ {0, . . . ,D}. In this setup a portfolio is
a Rd+1-valued predictable process
ζ= (ζt )t=1,...,T = (ζ0t , . . . ,ζDt )t=1,...,T
and it’s value is denoted by
V ζ0 :=
D∑
d=0
ζd1 S
d
0 ,
V ζt :=
D∑
d=0
ζdt S
d
t , t = 1, . . . ,T.
A portfolio ζ is called self-financing if
D∑
d=0
ζdt S
d
t =
D∑
d=0
ζdt+1S
d
t for t = 1, . . . ,T −1.
3The financial market model is taken from (Föllmer and Schied 2016, Section 5.1).
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We denote by (V˜ ζt )t=0,...,T the discounted portfolio value process, byPe the set of equiv-
alent martingale measures and define for t = 0, . . . ,T :
Tt := {τ :Ω→ {0, . . . ,T } stopping time : τÊ t }.
We assume that the financial market is arbitrage free, but not necessarily complete
which is equivalent to the assumption:
Pe 6= ;.
Define
X := {X ∈L 0(Ω,F ,P )| lim
c→∞ supP∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[|X |1{|X |Êc}]= 0}.
Definition 3.1. A game option or Game Contingent Claim (GCC) (Y , Z ) is a contract
between a seller and a buyer which consists of nonnegative, adapted payoff processes
Y = (Yt )t=0,...,T , Z = (Zt )t=0,...,T such that Yt É Zt and Yt , Zt ∈X , a choice of a cancella-
tion time σ ∈T0 by the seller and a choice of an exercise time τ ∈T0 by the buyer.
The seller pays the buyer at time σ∧τ the following payoff:
R(σ,τ) := Zσ1{σ<τ}+Yτ1{σÊτ}.
In order to define the notion of a no-arbitrage price (NA price) for a GCC in an in-
complete financial market, the idea is to consider for fixed stopping times τ,σ ∈T0 for
buyer and seller the payoff R(σ,τ) as an European option. To be able to compare these
options for different stopping times, we have to take the interest rate into account. Ba-
sically the idea is that the payoff R(σ,τ) is invested in the riskless asset at time σ∧τ.
This leads to the the following European option:
C (σ,τ) := (1+ r )T−(σ∧τ)R(σ,τ).
For this option the set of NA prices is given by
Π(C (σ,τ)) := {EP∗[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)] : P∗ ∈Pe }.
(Note that since Zt ∈X for all t = 0, . . . ,T , EP∗[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)] <∞ for all σ,τ ∈T0
and for all P∗ ∈Pe ).
But how do we define the set of NA prices of a GCC? It should be possible for the buyer
to choose a stopping time such that no matter what stopping time the seller chooses,
there exists a NA price for the corresponding European option which is greater or equal
than our candidate for a NA price of the GCC. If this condition is not satisfied our candi-
date price would be too high in the sense that no matter what stopping time the buyer
chooses, there would exist a stopping time for the seller such that our candidate price
would be strictly above all NA prices for the corresponding European option. If we also
consider that the seller should be able to find a stopping time such that our candidate
price is not too low in a similar sense we are led to the following definition. (The def-
inition extends the definition of (Föllmer and Schied 2016, Definition 6.29, p. 376) for
American options to game options).
Definition 3.2. Let (Y , Z ) be a GCC. Denote by Π(Y , Z ) the set of NA prices for (Y , Z ).
We define pi ∈R to be inΠ(Y , Z ) if the following two conditions are satisfied.
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(i) "pi is not too high": there exists τ˜ ∈ T0 such that for all σ ∈ T0 there exists piσ ∈
Π(C (σ, τ˜)) with piÉpiσ.
(ii) "pi is not too low": there exists σ˜ ∈T0 such that for all τ ∈T0 there exists
piτ ∈Π(C (σ˜,τ)) with piÊpiτ.
We will now characterize the set of NA prices of a GCC (Y , Z ). Define for P∗ ∈Pe
W P
∗
0 := inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
Let us consider the case that P∗ would be the unique equivalent martingale mea-
sure (hence we would have an complete financial market model). In complete markets
the fair price of an option is typically defined as the cost of the cheapest superhedge
against this option. By the results of (Kifer 2000) it follows that W P
∗
0 is the (unique) fair
price of a GCC 4. The following theorem characterizes the set of NA prices of a GCC.
We will see that if we consider for an equivalent martingale measure the fair price that
we would obtain if this measure would be the unique equivalent martingale measure,
this price is also a NA price in the incomplete market framework. Furthermore the
set of NA prices is an interval with bounds equal to the infimum and supremum over
the fair prices obtained in the complete markets corresponding to the set of equivalent
martingale measures.
Theorem 3.3. Let (Y , Z ) be a GCC.
(i) Then
W P
∗
0 ∈Π(Y , Z ).
(ii) For all pi ∈Π(Y , Z ) the following holds
inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]ÉpiÉ sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
(iii)
infΠ(Y , Z )= inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
= inf
P∗∈Pe
inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]= inf
P∗∈Pe
W P
∗
0 .
supΠ(Y , Z )= sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
= sup
P∗∈Pe
sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]= sup
P∗∈Pe
W P
∗
0 .
(iv) Π(Y , Z ) is an interval.
4The results of (Kifer 2000) in the binomial model can be extended to the financial market model we
consider by quite similar arguments.
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We will now discuss the topic of superhedging for game options in our incomplete
market framework. Superhedging for both, seller and buyer, will be considered. We
will use the results obtained in Section 2 for our superhedging approach. For this pur-
pose we consider the setup of Section 2 withQb =Pe =Qs and the discounted payoff
processes of a GCC (Y , Z ): ((1+ r )−t Yt )t=0,...,T and
((1+ r )−t Zt )t=0,...,T . By definition every P∗ ∈Pe is equivalent to P and it can be shown
that Pe is time-consistent5. The assumption that buyer and seller have no informa-
tion about the set of priors of each other may not seem appropriate in our incomplete
market framework. But since the concept of superhedging requires to be safe in any
possible scenario, we will consider worst cases for buyer and seller which correspond
to the stopping games considered in Section 2.
We start by considering the question how the seller can superhedge against a GCC.
In order to superhedge against a GCC the seller has to find a stopping time and a self-
financing portfolio such that her liabilities are covered by the portfolio value indepen-
dent of the exercise time the buyer chooses.
Definition 3.4. Let (Y , Z ) be a GCC. A superhedge for the seller is a pair (σ,ζ) consisting
of a stopping time σ ∈T0 and a self-financing portfolio ζ such that
V ζσ∧t ÊR(σ, t ) a.s. ∀t = 0, . . . ,T.
We are interested in finding the cheapest superhedge. The cost of this superhedge
would be the lowest price for which the seller would be able to sell the GCC without
facing any risk. In the following theorem we obtain that there exists a cheapest super-
hedge for the seller and its cost is equal to the upper bound of the set of NA prices of
the considered GCC. The stopping time the seller chooses in this superhedge is
σ↑0 := inf{s Ê 0 : W ↑s = (1+ r )−s Zs}∧T
which is an optimal stopping time for the seller in the two player stopping game for the
worst case of the seller (see Theorem 2.3).
Theorem 3.5. Let (Y , Z ) be a GCC. There exists a self-financing portfolio ζ˜ such that
(σ↑0, ζ˜) is a superhedge for the seller with V
ζ˜
0 = supΠ(Y , Z ). Moreover V ζ˜0 = c where
c := inf{V ζ0 : there exists σ ∈T0 and ζ self-financing such that (σ,ζ)
is a superhedge for the seller }.
We will now turn to the question how the buyer can superhedge against a GCC.
In contrast to the seller, the buyer can only superhedge for a given price under the as-
sumption that the GCC would be available for this price. In order to superhedge against
a GCC, the buyer collects an initial investment to buy the GCC by lending money from
the bank or short selling shares of the risky assets. The buyer then has to find a stopping
time such that her debts which are managed in a self-financing portfolio are covered
by the payoff of the GCC independent of what cancellation time the seller chooses.
Definition 3.6. Let (Y , Z ) be a GCC. A superhedge for the buyer is a triple (θ,τ,ζ) con-
sisting of an initial investment θ ∈R+, a stopping time τ ∈T0 and a self-financing port-
folio ζ such that
V ζ0 =−θ and V ζτ∧t +R(t ,τ)Ê 0 a.s. ∀t = 0, . . . ,T.
5See (Föllmer and Schied 2016, Proposition 6.43, p. 386), for example.
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We are interested in finding the most expensive superhedge for the buyer. The ini-
tial investment the buyer has to make for this superhedge would be the highest price
the buyer could pay for the GCC without facing any risk. The next theorem states
that there exists a most expensive superhedge for the buyer and the initial investment
needed for this superhedge is equal to the lower bound of the set of NA prices of the
GCC. The stopping time the buyer chooses in this superhedge is
τ↓0 := inf{s Ê 0 : W ↓s = (1+ r )−sYs}
which is an optimal stopping time for the buyer in the two player stopping game for
the worst case of the buyer (see Theorem 2.2).
Theorem 3.7. Let (Y , Z ) be a GCC. There exists a self-financing portfolio ζ˜ with V ζ˜0 =
− infΠ(Y , Z ) such that (infΠ(Y , Z ),τ↓0, ζ˜) is a superhedge for the buyer. Moreover
infΠ(Y , Z )=m
where
m := sup{c Ê 0 : there exists ζ self-financing and τ ∈T0 such that
(c,ζ,τ) is a superhedge for the buyer }.
4 Proofs of the Main Results
This section contains the proofs of the results of Section 2 and Section 3. We start with
the proofs of Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3. The key tool we will use is the following
lemma which states that the law of iterated expectations also holds for multiple prior
conditional expectations 6.
Lemma 4.1. Let (Ω,F ,P0) be a probability space equipped with a filtration (Ft )t=0,...,T
such that
F0 = {;,Ω}⊆F1 ⊆ . . .⊆FT =F ,
where T ∈ N denotes a finite time horizon. Let Q 6= ; be a time -consistent set of prob-
ability measures on (Ω,F ) that are equivalent to P0. Let X ∈XQ and t ∈ {0, . . . ,T −1}.
Then
essinf
P∈Q
EP [essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]= essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Ft ].
Proof. Let X ∈XQ and t ∈ {0, . . . ,T −1}. At first we show that the set
C := {EQ [X |Ft+1] : Q ∈Q}
is downward directed. For this purpose let P,Q ∈Q and define
A := {EP [X |Ft+1]< EQ [X |Ft+1]} ∈Ft+1.
Then
EP [X |Ft+1]∧EQ [X |Ft+1]= 1AEP [X |Ft+1]+ 1AcEQ [X |Ft+1]
6This result was already developed in (Riedel 2009), but under an additional weak compactness as-
sumption that we dropped in this paper.
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and Proposition A.1(ii) implies that there exists R ∈Q such that
ER [X |Ft+1]= 1AEP [X |Ft+1]+ 1AcEQ [X |Ft+1].
Hence C is downward directed and so there exists a nonincreasing sequence
(EPn [X |Ft+1])n∈N in C with
lim
n→∞E
Pn [X |Ft+1]= essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1] a.s.
By Proposition A.6 and Proposition A.8 we obtain for each n ∈N:
|EPn [X |Ft+1]| É |EP1 [X |Ft+1]|+ |essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1]| ∈L 1(Ω,F ,P ), ∀P ∈Q.
Then by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem it holds for all P ∈Q
EP [essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]= EP [ lim
n→∞E
Pn [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]
= lim
n→∞E
P [EPn [X |Ft+1]|Ft ].
By Proposition A.5 for each n ∈N there exists Rn ∈Q such that
EP [EPn [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]= ERn [X |Ft ]Ê essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Ft ].
From this it follows for all P ∈Q
EP [essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]= lim
n→∞E
P [EPn [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]
Ê essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Ft ]
and so
essinf
P∈Q
EP [essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]Ê essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Ft ].
The other inequality just follows from the classical law of iterated expectations:
EP [essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]É EP [EP [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]= EP [X |Ft ], ∀P ∈Q
⇒ essinf
P∈Q
EP [essinf
Q∈Q
EQ [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]É essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Ft ].
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We start by showing some integrability conditions. Since for all
t = 0, . . . ,T , Yt , Zt ∈XQb are nonnegative and
0ÉR(σ,τ)É Zσ∧τ É
T∑
t=0
Zt ∈ XQb , ∀σ,τ ∈T0,
0É Yt ÉW ↓t É Zt ∈ XQb , ∀t = 0, . . . ,T,
we obtain R(σ,τ) ∈ XQb for allσ,τ ∈T0 and W ↓t ∈XQb for all t = 0, . . . ,T , by Proposition
A.3. Furthermore we obtain by considering any P ∈Qb
0É essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ]É EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ] ∈ XQb .
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Hence essinfP∈Qb E
P [R(σ,τ)|Ft ] ∈ XQb for all σ,τ ∈T0 and for all t = 0, . . . ,T .
We show (1) by backward induction (notice that by definitionσ↓t ,τ
↓
t ∈Tt , because W ↓T =
YT ). By definition W
↓
T = YT and for all σ,τ ∈ TT we have σ ≡ T ≡ τ. Since R(T,T ) =
YT ∈XQb isFT -measurable, (1) is satisfied by Proposition A.9. Now assume that (1) is
satisfied for t +1. Let σ ∈Tt and consider the following decomposition of W ↓t :
W ↓t = 1{t=τ↓t }W
↓
t + 1{t<τ↓t }∩{t<σ}W
↓
t + 1{t<τ↓t }∩{t=σ}W
↓
t .
Since 1{t=τ↓t },1{t<τ↓t }∩{t<σ} and 1{t<τ↓t }∩{t=σ} areFt -measurable, by Proposition A.9 we ob-
tain on the set {t = τ↓t }
W ↓t = Yt = essinfP∈Qb E
P [Yt |Ft ]= essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ, t )|Ft ]= essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ↓t )|Ft ],
on the set {t < τ↓t }∩ {t <σ}
W ↓t Émax(Yt ,essinfP∈Qb E
P [W ↓t+1|Ft ])= essinfP∈Qb E
P [W ↓t+1|Ft ]
É essinf
P∈Qb
EP [essinf
Q∈Qb
EQ [R(max(σ, t +1),τ↓t+1)|Ft+1]|Ft ]
= essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(max(σ, t +1),τ↓t+1)|Ft ]= essinfP∈Qb E
P [R(σ,τ↓t )|Ft ],
and on the set {t < τ↓t }∩ {t =σ}
W ↓t É Zt = essinfP∈Qb E
P [Zt |Ft ]= essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ↓t )|Ft ].
Hence the second inequality in (1) holds true. Let τ ∈ Tt and consider the following
decomposition of W ↓t :
W ↓t = 1{t=σ↓t }W
↓
t + 1{t<σ↓t }∩{t<τ}W
↓
t + 1{t<σ↓t }∩{t=τ}W
↓
t .
We obtain on the set {t =σ↓t }
W ↓t = Zt = essinfP∈Qb E
P [Zt |Ft ]Ê essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(t ,τ)|Ft ]= essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ↓t ,τ)|Ft ],
on the set {t <σ↓t }∩ {t < τ}
W ↓t Êmin(Zt ,essinfP∈Qb E
P [W ↓t+1|Ft ])= essinfP∈Qb E
P [W ↓t+1|Ft ]
Ê essinf
P∈Qb
EP [essinf
Q∈Qb
EQ [R(σ↓t+1,max(τ, t +1))|Ft+1]|Ft ]
= essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ↓t+1,max(τ, t +1))|Ft ]= essinfP∈Qb E
P [R(σ↓t ,τ)|Ft ],
and on the set {t <σ↓t }∩ {t = τ}
W ↓t Ê Yt = essinfP∈Qb E
P [Yt |Ft ]= essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ↓t ,τ)|Ft ].
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So we have shown that equation (1) holds true. From this inequality we obtain for all
t = 0, . . . ,T :
W ↓t É essinfP∈Qb E
P [R(σ,τ↓t )|Ft ], ∀σ ∈Ft
⇒W ↓t É essinf
σ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ↓t )|Ft ]
É esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
σ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ],
W ↓t Ê essinfP∈Qb E
P [R(σ↓t ,τ)|Ft ], ∀τ ∈Ft
⇒W ↓t Ê esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ↓t ,τ)|Ft ]
Ê essinf
σ∈Tt
esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ].
Hence
essinf
σ∈Tt
esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ]ÉW ↓t
É esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
σ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ]
É essinf
σ∈Tt
esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ]
and so
W ↓t = essinf
σ∈Tt
esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ]
= esssup
τ∈Tt
essinf
σ∈Tt
essinf
P∈Qb
EP [R(σ,τ)|Ft ].
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Let X ∈XQs and τ ∈T0. Then by definition of the essential infi-
mum
esssup
P∈Qs
EP [X |Fτ]=−essinf
P∈Qs
EP [−X |Fτ].
Hence by Proposition A.8 we obtain for all Q ∈Qs
esssup
P∈Qs
EP [X |Fτ] ∈L 1(Ω,F ,Q)
and we also obtain that Proposition A.9(i),(ii) and (iv) hold true for the nonlinear oper-
ator esssupP∈Qs E
P [·|Fτ] as well.
Let X ∈XQs and t ∈ {0, . . . ,T −1}. Then by Lemma 4.1
esssup
P∈Qs
EP [esssup
Q∈Qs
EQ [X |Ft+1]|Ft ]=−essinf
P∈Qs
EP [essinf
Q∈Qs
EQ [−X |Ft+1]|Ft ]
=−essinf
P∈Qs
EP [−X |Ft ]
= esssup
P∈Qs
EP [X |Ft ].
and so the law of iterated expectations also holds true for the nonlinear operator
esssupP∈Qs E
P [·|Ft ]. Hence the proof follows by the same arguments as used in the
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proof of Theorem 2.2. The only difference is that we do not necessarily obtain
esssupP∈Qs E
P [R(σ,τ)|Ft ] ∈XQs for all σ,τ ∈T0 and t = 0, . . . ,T . But since
esssupP∈Qs E
P [R(σ,τ)|Ft ] ∈L 1(Ω,F ,Q) for all Q ∈Qs and Proposition A.9(i) also
holds under this weaker integrability condition, this does not cause any problems.
We will now continue with the proofs of the results of Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.
(i) Let P∗ ∈ Pe . Let us consider the stopping games of Section 2 with the discounted
potential payoff processes of the GCC andQb = {P∗}=Qs . Then by Theorem 2.2 (The-
orem 2.3) there exist stopping times σ∗0 ,τ
∗
0 ∈T0 such that for all σ,τ ∈T0:
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∗0∧τR(σ∗0 ,τ)]ÉW P
∗
0 É EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τ∗0 R(σ,τ∗0 )].
Hence τ∗0 satisfies condition 3.2(i) and σ
∗
0 satisfies condition 3.2(ii) which implies
W P
∗
0 ∈Π(Y , Z ).
(ii) Let pi ∈Π(Y , Z ) (we know by (i) that Π(Y , Z ) is not empty). By Definition 3.2(i) there
exists τ˜ ∈T0 such that for all σ ∈T0
piÉ sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τ˜R(σ, τ˜)].
Hence
piÉ inf
σ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τ˜R(σ, τ˜)]
É sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
By Definition 3.2(ii) there exists σ˜ ∈T0 such that for all τ ∈T0
piÊ inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ˜∧τR(σ˜,τ)].
Hence
piÊ sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ˜∧τR(σ˜,τ)]
Ê inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
(iii) Fix σ ∈T0 and define for t = 0, . . . ,T ,
Hσt := (1+ r )−σ∧t R(σ, t ).
Then Hσt isFt -measurable and, since Zt ∈X , we have for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[Hσt ]<∞.
With the duality result (Föllmer and Schied 2016, Theorem 6.46, p. 388) we obtain for
all σ ∈T0:
sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]= sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[Hστ ]
= inf
P∗∈Pe
sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[Hστ ]
= inf
P∗∈Pe
sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
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Hence
inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]= inf
σ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
= inf
P∗∈Pe
inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
= inf
P∗∈Pe
W P
∗
0 .
With similar arguments we also obtain
sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]= sup
P∗∈Pe
W P
∗
0 .
By considering (i) and (ii) we conclude
infΠ(Y , Z )= inf
P∗∈Pe
W P
∗
0 ,
supΠ(Y , Z )= sup
P∗∈Pe
W P
∗
0 .
(iv) Let pi1,pi2 ∈Π(Y , Z ) and λ ∈ [0,1]. Assume w.l.o.g. that pi1 Épi2. Define
x :=λpi1+ (1−λ)pi2.
Since pi1 É x Épi2 and pi1,pi2 ∈Π(Y , Z ), x is not too high and not too low in the sense of
Definition 3.2. Hence x ∈ Π(Y , Z ) which implies that Π(Y , Z ) ⊆ R is convex and so an
interval.
In the following we will proof the superhedging results of Theorem 3.5 and The-
orem 3.7. We will use the following lemma which states that the discounted stopped
value process of a self-financing portfoilio in the market model of Chaper 3 is a uni-
form Pe -martingale. The proof of the lemma follows by similar arguments as used in
(Föllmer and Schied 2016, Theorem 5.14, p. 299).
Lemma 4.2. Let σ ∈ T0 and P∗ ∈ Pe . Let ζ be a self-financing portfolio such that
E∗[(V˜ ζσ∧t )
−]<∞ for all t = 0, . . . ,T . Then (V˜ ζσ∧t )t=0,...,T is a P∗-martingale.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Let (σ,ζ) be a superhedge for the seller. (There always exists a
superhedge for the seller, considerσ≡ 0 and any self-financing portfolio ζwith V ζ0 Ê Z0
for example). ζ is self-financing and V ζσ∧t Ê R(σ, t ) Ê 0 a.s. for all t = 0, . . . ,T , hence
(V˜ ζσ∧t )t=0,...,T is a P
∗-martingale for each P∗ ∈Pe . Let P∗ ∈Pe . Then for each τ ∈T0:
V ζ0 = EP
∗
[V˜ ζσ∧τ]Ê EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
Ê inf
σ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
So by definition for all τ ∈T0 and for all P∗ ∈Pe
c Ê inf
σ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
which gives us
c Ê sup
P∗∈Pe
sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)] 3.3= supΠ(Y , Z ). (2)
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Let σ ∈T0 and define (Uσt )t=0,...,T by
Uσt := esssup
τ∈Tt
esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Ft ].
Cσt := (1+ r )−σ∧t R(σ, t ) is nonnegative, Ft -measurable and supP∗∈Pe EP
∗
[Cσt ] <∞ for
all t = 0, . . . ,T , hence (Uσt )t=0,...,T is the smallest uniformPe -supermartingale that dom-
inates (Cσt )t=0,...,T
7. By the uniform Doob decomposition 8 there exists a nondecreas-
ing adapted process (Aσt )t=0,...,T with
Aσ0 = 0 and a D-dimensional predictable process (θσt )t=1,...,T = (θσ,1t , . . . ,θσ,Dt )t=1,...,T
such that for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
Uσt =Uσ0 +
t∑
s=1
D∑
d=1
θσ,ds (S˜
d
s − S˜ds−1)− Aσt a.s.
There exists a self-financing portfolio 9 (ζσt )t=1,...,T = (ζσ,0t ,θσt )t=1,...,T with V ζ
σ
0 = Uσ0 .
Since (ζσt )t=1,...,T is self-financing this implies for each t = 0, . . . ,T :
V˜ ζ
σ
t =Uσ0 +
t∑
s=1
D∑
d=1
θσ,ds (S˜
d
s − S˜ds−1)=Uσt + Aσt .
Since we have for all t = 0, . . . ,T
V˜ ζ
σ
σ∧t = 1{tÉσ}V˜ ζ
σ
t + 1{t>σ}V˜ ζ
σ
σ
Ê 1{tÉσ}Uσt + 1{t>σ}Uσσ
Ê 1{tÉσ}Cσt + 1{t>σ}Uσσ
and
1{t>σ}Uσσ = 1{t>σ}
T∑
s=0
1{σ=s}Uσs
= 1{t>σ}
T∑
s=0
1{σ=s} esssup
τ∈Ts
esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Fs]
Ê 1{t>σ}
T∑
s=0
1{σ=s} esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧T R(σ,T )|Fs]
Ê 1{t>σ} esssup
P∗∈Pe
(
T∑
s=0
1{σ=s}EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧T R(σ,T )|Fs])
= 1{t>σ} esssup
P∗∈Pe
(
T∑
s=0
1{σ=s}EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧T R(σ,T )|Fσ])
= 1{t>σ} esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧T R(σ,T )|Fσ]
Ê esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[1{t>σ}(1+ r )−σ∧T R(σ,T )|Fσ]
Ê 1{t>σ}(1+ r )−σZσ
= 1{t>σ}(1+ r )−σ∧t R(σ, t )
= 1{t>σ}Cσt
7See (Föllmer and Schied 2016, Theorem 7.2, p. 395), for example.
8See (Föllmer and Schied 2016, Theorem 7.5, p. 397), for example.
9See (Föllmer and Schied 2016, p. 295), for example.
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it follows that
V ζ
σ
σ∧t ÊR(σ, t ) a.s. ∀t = 0, . . . ,T.
So (σ,ζσ) is a superhedge for the seller with
V ζ
σ
0 =Uσ0 = sup
τ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
Hence
c ÉV ζ
σ
↑
0
0 = sup
τ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ↑0∧τR(σ↑0,τ)]
2.3= sup
τ∈T0
inf
σ∈T0
sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
3.3= supΠ(Y , Z ) (2)É c.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Let (θ,τ,ζ) be a superhedge for the buyer. (If we consider θ = 0
and ζdt = 0 for all d = 0, . . . ,D and for all t = 1, . . . ,T the conditions of Definition 3.6
are satisfied for any τ ∈T0 which implies that there always exists a superhedge for the
buyer). Then V ζτ∧t +R(t ,τ)Ê 0 a.s. for all t = 0, . . . ,T , hence we obtain for all t = 0, . . . ,T
and for all P∗ ∈P ∗
EP
∗
[(V˜ ζτ∧t )
−]É EP∗[(1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)]É EP∗[
T∑
t=0
Zt ]<∞.
So (V˜ ζτ∧t )t=0,...,T is a P
∗-martingale for all P∗ ∈Pe . Hence for all σ ∈T0 and P∗ ∈Pe , we
obtain
θ =−V ζ0 = EP
∗
[−V˜ ζτ∧σ]É EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
É sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)].
Hence, by definition
m É inf
P∗∈Pe
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T0
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)] 3.3= infΠ(Y , Z ). (3)
Fix τ ∈T0 and consider ((1+r )t−(t∧τ)R(t ,τ))t=0,...,T as an American option. There exists
a self-financing portfolio ζτ such that 10
V˜ ζ
τ
t Ê (1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)Ê 0 a.s. ∀t = 0, . . . ,T.
Hence we can interpret (V˜ ζ
τ
t −(1+r )−t∧τR(t ,τ))t=0,...,T also as an American option. De-
fine (Uτt )t=0,...,T by
Uτt := esssup
σ∈Tt
esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[V˜ ζ
τ
σ − (1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Ft ].
10See (Föllmer and Schied 2016, Corollary 7.9, p. 401), for example.
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Then (Uτt )t=0,...,T is a uniformPe -supermartingale, because for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
EP
∗
[V˜ ζ
τ
t − (1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)]É EP
∗
[V˜ ζ
τ
t ]= V˜ ζ
τ
0 , ∀P∗ ∈Pe
⇒ sup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[V˜ ζ
τ
t − (1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)]<∞.
Define for all t = 0, . . . ,T
Dτt := essinf
σ∈Tt
essinf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Ft ].
Then
Uτt = esssup
σ∈Tt
esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[V˜ ζ
τ
σ − (1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Ft ]
= esssup
σ∈Tt
esssup
P∗∈Pe
(V˜ ζ
τ
t +EP
∗
[−(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Ft ])
= V˜ ζτt +esssup
σ∈Tt
esssup
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[−(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Ft ]
= V˜ ζτt −Dτt .
By the uniform Doob decomposition there exists an adapted nondecreasing process
(Bτt )t=0,...,T with B
τ
0 = 0 and a D-dimensional predictable process
(γτt )t=1,...,T = (γτ,1t , . . . ,γτ,Dt )t=1,...,T such that for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
V˜ ζ
τ
t −Dτt = V˜ ζ
τ
0 −Dτ0+
t∑
s=1
D∑
d=1
γτ,ds (S˜
d
s − S˜ds−1)−Bτt a.s.
Hence, since ζτ is self-financing:
−Dτt +Bτt =−Dτ0+ V˜ ζ
τ
0 − V˜ ζ
τ
t +
t∑
s=1
D∑
d=1
γτ,ds (S˜
d
s − S˜ds−1)
=−Dτ0−
t∑
s=1
D∑
d=1
ζτ,ds (S˜
d
s − S˜ds−1)+
t∑
s=1
D∑
d=1
γτ,ds (S˜
d
s − S˜ds−1)
=−Dτ0+
t∑
s=1
D∑
d=1
(γτ,ds −ζτ,ds )(S˜ds − S˜ds−1).
There exists a self-financing portfolio
(ητt )t=0,...,T = (ητ,0t ,γτ,1t −ζτ,1t , . . . ,γτ,Dt −ζτ,Dt )t=1,...,T
with V η
τ
0 =−Dτ0. Hence V˜
ητ
t =−Dτt +Bτt for all t = 0, . . . ,T .
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Since
Dττ =
T∑
t=0
1{t=τ}Dτt
=
T∑
t=0
1{t=τ} essinf
σ∈Tt
essinf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)|Ft ]
É
T∑
t=0
1{t=τ} essinf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−T∧τR(T,τ)|Ft ]
=
T∑
t=0
1{t=τ} essinf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−τYτ|Ft ]
=
T∑
t=0
essinf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[1{t=τ}(1+ r )−t Yt |Ft ]
=
T∑
t=0
1{t=τ}(1+ r )−t Yt = (1+ r )−τYτ,
we obtain for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
Dτt∧τ = 1{t<τ}Dτt + 1{tÊτ}Dττ É 1{t<τ} essinf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)|Ft ]+ 1{tÊτ}(1+ r )−τYτ
= 1{t<τ}(1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)+ 1{tÊτ}(1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)
= (1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ).
Hence for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
V˜ η
τ
t∧τ+ (1+ r )−t∧τR(t ,τ)Ê V˜ η
τ
t∧τ+Dτt∧τ =Bτt∧τ Ê 0 a.s.
and so (Dτ0,τ,η
τ) is a superhedge for the buyer. For the stopping time τ↓0 we then obtain
m ÊDτ
↓
0
0 = infσ∈T0 infP∗∈Pe E
P∗[(1+ r )−σ∧τ↓0 R(σ,τ↓0)]
2.2= inf
σ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
inf
P∗∈Pe
EP
∗
[(1+ r )−σ∧τR(σ,τ)]
3.3= infΠ(Y , Z ) (3)Ê m.
5 Conclusion
We extended the optimal stopping theory in multiple prior frameworks (for nonnega-
tive payoff processes) by solving two Dynkin games in multiple prior frameworks, one
for each worst case scenario of a player. The solution of these stopping games under
nonlinear expectations allowed us to derive for a game option a cheapest superhedge
for the seller and a most expensive superhedge for the buyer in a general incomplete fi-
nancial market model. The costs of these superhedges correspond to the bounds of the
set of no-arbitrage prices we derived by the approach to consider the payoff of a game
option as an European option for fixed stopping times. These results are a consistent
extension of the hedging and pricing results for game options in complete markets.
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A step to extend the results of this paper further would be to drop the nonneg-
ativity assumption on the payoff processes for the Dynkin game in a multiple prior
framework. We only used this assumption for integrability conditions, but it should
be possible to derive them without the assumption or show that the arguments of the
proof hold under weaker integrability conditions. Furthermore it would be interest-
ing to also drop the assumption that the players have no information about the set of
priors of the other player. Then, instead of considering a stopping game for the worst
case scenario of each player, one could consider only one stopping game and search
for Nash equilibria. Besides a consideration of an infinite time horizon would be in-
teresting. The main difficulty for the infinite time horizon case is that it is no longer
economically justifiable to work with equivalent probability measures.
A Appendix
Let (Ω,F ,P0) be a probability space equipped with a filtration (Ft )t=0,...,T such that
F0 = {;,Ω}⊆F1 ⊆ . . .⊆FT =F ,
where T ∈N denotes a finite time horizon. Define
T := {τ :Ω→ {0, . . . ,T } : τ stopping time}.
We consider a set of probability measuresQ 6= ; on (Ω,F ) which are equivalent to P0.
We call Q a set of priors and we assume that Q is time-consistent: let P,Q ∈ Q and
denote by (pt )t=0,...,T (resp. (qt )t=0,...,T ) the density process of P (resp. Q) with respect
to P0. Let τ ∈T and define R by setting for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
dR
dP0
|Ft :=
{
pt , t É τ
pτqt
qτ
, t > τ.
Then R ∈Q.
The definition of time-consistency is taken from (Riedel 2009) and two equivalent char-
acterizations which frequently arise in the literature are stated in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition A.1. (Riedel 2009, Lemma 8)
The following properties are equivalent for the set of priorsQ.
(i) Q is time-conistent.
(ii) Q is stable: let τ ∈T , A ∈Fτ and P,Q ∈Q. Then there exists a unique probability
measure R ∈Q such that
dR
dP0
|Fτ =
dP
dP0
|Fτ ,
ER [X |Fτ]= 1AEQ [X |Fτ]+ 1AcEP [X |Fτ], ∀X ∈X .
(iii) Q is rectangular: let τ ∈T and P,Q ∈Q. Define
R(B) := EP [EQ [1B |Fτ]], ∀B ∈F .
Then R ∈Q.
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Define
X := {X ∈L 0(Ω,F ,P0) : lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
EP [|X |1{|X |Êc}]= 0}.
A random variable X ∈X is calledQ-uniformly integrable 11. In the following proposi-
tion we obtain an equivalent characterization ofQ-uniformly integrable random vari-
ables. This characterization is an epsilon delta criterion similar to the epsilon delta
criterion which holds for uniformly integrable families of random variables. The proof
also follows by similar arguments 12.
Proposition A.2. Let X ∈L 0(Ω,F ,P0). Then the following properties are equivalent:
(i) X ∈X .
(ii) supP∈Q EP [|X |] <∞ and for each ² > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all A ∈F
with supP∈Q P (A)É δ:
EP [|X |1A]< ², ∀P ∈Q.
Proof. Assume that (i) holds. Since X ∈X we have
lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
EP [|X |1{|X |Êc}]= 0.
So there exists a constant K > 0 such that supP∈Q EP [|X |1{|X |ÊK }]< 1. Hence
sup
P∈Q
EP [|X |]= sup
P∈Q
(EP [|X |1{|X |<K }]+EP [|X |1{|X |ÊK }])ÉK +1<∞.
Let ²> 0. Since X ∈X there exists a constant K² > 0 such that
sup
P∈Q
EP [|X |1{|X |ÊK²}]<
²
2
.
Define δ := ²2K² . Then for all A ∈F with supP∈Q P (A)É δ and for all P ∈Q:
EP [|X |1A]= EP [|X |1A1{|X |ÊK²}]+EP [|X |1A1{|X |<K²}]
É EP [|X |1{|X |ÊK²}]+K² ·P (A)
< ²
2
+K² ·δ= ².
Assume that (ii) holds. Let ²> 0 and δ as in (ii). Since by assumption
supP∈Q EP [|X |]<∞, it follows for large c that 1c supp∈Q EP [|X |]É δ and so by the Markov
inequality
P [|X | Ê c]É 1
c
EP [|X |]É δ, ∀P ∈Q
⇒ sup
p∈Q
P [|X | Ê c]É δ.
By assumption we then obtain for large c:
EP [|X |1{|X |Êc}]< ², ∀P ∈Q
⇒ sup
p∈Q
EP [|X |1{|X |Êc}]É ².
From this we can conclude that limc→∞ supP∈Q EP [|X |1{|X |Êc}]= 0 and so X ∈X .
11The definition is taken from (Riedel 2009).
12See (Röckner 2016, Lemma 1.8.8), for example.
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In the next proposition we state some properties of Q-uniformly integrable ran-
dom variables.
Proposition A.3. (i) Let X ∈X . Then X ∈L 1(Ω,F ,P ) for all P ∈Q.
(ii) Let X ∈X and let Z ∈L 0(Ω,F ,P0) such that |Z | É |X |. Then Z ∈X .
(iii) Let X ∈L 0(Ω,F ,P0) be bounded. Then X ∈X .
(iv) Let Y ∈L 0(Ω,F ,P0) be bounded and X ∈X . Then Y X ∈X .
(v) Let Xn ∈X ,n = 1, . . . , N . Then
N∑
n=1
|Xn | ∈X .
Proof. Since Proposition A.2 implies
sup
P∈Q
EP [|X |]<∞.
for all X ∈ X the properties (i)-(iv) follow directly by the definition of Q-uniformly
integrability.
In order to proof property (v) we notice that for all P ∈Q, for all c ∈ R and every n ∈
{1, . . . , N }:
EP [|Xn |1{∑Nm=1 |Xm |Êc}]É EP [|Xn |
N∑
m=1
1{|Xm |Ê cN }]=
N∑
m=1
EP [|Xn |1{|Xm |Ê cN }]
=
N∑
m=1
(EP [|Xn |1{|Xm |Ê cN }1{|Xn |Ê|Xm |}]+E
P [|Xn |1{|Xm |Ê cN }1{|Xn |<|Xm |}])
É
N∑
m=1
EP [|Xn |1{|Xn |Ê cN }]+
N∑
m=1
EP [|Xm |1{|Xm |Ê cN }1{|Xn |<|Xm |}]
ÉNEP [|Xn |1{|Xn |Ê cN }]+
N∑
m=1
EP [|Xm |1{|Xm |Ê cN }].
From this we can conclude
0É lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
EP [
N∑
n=1
|Xn |1{∑Nm=1 |Xm |Êc}]= limc→∞ supP∈Q(
N∑
n=1
EP [|Xn |1{∑Nm=1 |Xm |Êc}])
É lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
(N
N∑
n=1
EP [|Xn |1{|Xn |Ê cN }]+N
N∑
m=1
EP [|Xm |1{|Xm |Ê cN }])
= lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
(2N
N∑
n=1
EP [|Xn |1{|Xn |Ê cN }])
É lim
c→∞2N
N∑
n=1
sup
P∈Q
EP [|Xn |1{|Xn |Ê cN }]
= 2N
N∑
n=1
lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
EP [|Xn |1{|Xn |Ê cN }]= 0.
The following formula is known as Bayes’ formula and can for example be found in
(Karatzas and Shreve 1997, p. 193).
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Proposition A.4. Let Q be a probability measure on (Ω,F ) such that Q ∼ P0 and let
τ,σ ∈T such that σÉ τ. Let X ∈L 1(Ω,F ,Q) beFτ-measurable. Then
EQ [X |Fσ]= EP0 [X qτ|Fσ] 1
qσ
.
The next proposition gives us a time-consistent version of the law of iterated ex-
pectations.
Proposition A.5. Let P,Q ∈Q and σ,τ ∈T such that σÉ τ. Then there exists R ∈Q such
that for all X ∈X :
EP [EQ [X |Fτ]|Fσ]= ER [X |Fσ].
Proof. Let (pt )t=0,...,T and (qt )t=0,...,T be the density processes of P and Q with respect
to P0. Then for all t = 0, . . . ,T :
dQ
dP
|Ft =
qt
pt
.
Define R by
dR
dP0
:= pτ
qτ
qT .
By time-consistency R ∈Q. It holds that
dR
dP
=
dR
dP0
dP
dP0
=
pτ
qτ
qT
pT
= qT
pT
pτ
qτ
.
Hence by the optional sampling theorem
dR
dP
|Fσ = EP [
dR
dP
|Fσ]= EP [ qT
pT
pτ
qτ
|Fσ]
= EP [ pτ
qτ
EP [
qT
pT
|Fτ]|Fσ]
= EP [ pτ
qτ
qτ
pτ
|Fσ]= 1.
We obtain with Bayes’ formula and the law of iterated expectations for all X ∈X
ER [X |Fσ]= EP [X qT
pT
pτ
qτ
|Fσ]
= EP [EP [X qT
pT
|Fτ] pτ
qτ
|Fσ]
= EP [EQ [X |Fτ]|Fσ].
We will now show that conditional expectations ofQ-uniformly integrable random
variables areQ-uniformly integrable.
Proposition A.6. Let X ∈X , Q ∈Q and t ∈ {0, . . . ,T }. Then
EQ [X |Ft ] ∈X .
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Proof. Let ² > 0. By Proposition A.2 there exists δ > 0 such that for all A ∈ F with
supP∈Q P (A)É δ:
EP [|X |1A]< ², ∀P ∈Q.
We also know by Proposition A.2 that supP∈Q EP [|X |]<∞. So for large c:
1
c
sup
p∈Q
EP [|X |]É δ.
By the Markov inequality and by Proposition A.5 there exist RP ∈Q such that for large
c:
P (EQ [|X ||Ft ]Ê c)É 1
c
EP [EQ [|X ||Ft ]]= 1
c
ERP [|X |]É δ, ∀P ∈Q
⇒ sup
p∈Q
P (EQ [|X ||Ft ]Ê c)É δ.
Then by Proposition A.5 for each P ∈Q there exists R˜P ∈Q such that for large c:
EP [|EQ [X |Ft ]|1{|EQ [X |Ft ]|Êc}]É EP [EQ [|X ||Ft ]1{EQ [|X ||Ft ]Êc}]
= EP [EQ [|X |1{EQ [|X ||Ft ]Êc}|Ft ]]
= ER˜P [|X |1{EQ [|X ||Ft ]Êc}]< ².
This leads us to
sup
P∈Q
EP [|EQ [X |Ft ]|1{|EQ [X |Ft ]|Êc}]É ²
and so
lim
c→∞ supP∈Q
EP [|EQ [X |Ft ]|1{|EQ [X |Ft ]|Êc}]= 0.
Definition A.7. For X ∈X and t ∈ {0, . . . ,T } we define the multiple prior conditional
expectation by
Et (X ) := essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Ft ].
We also define the multiple prior conditional expectation for stopping times τ ∈T by
Eτ(X ) := essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Fτ].
If we consider a deterministic stopping time τ ≡ t ∈ {0, . . . ,T }, then by definition
Eτ(X ) = Et (X ) for all X ∈ X . With the help of the following two propositions it can
be shown that for X ∈X and τ ∈ T , Eτ(X ) coincides with the process (Et (X ))t=0,...,T
stopped at τ. For X ∈X we have by Proposition A.3(i) that X ∈L 1(Ω,F ,P ) for all P ∈
Q. Hence multiple prior conditional expectations are well defined. The next proposi-
tion shows that multiple prior conditional expectations are integrable.
Proposition A.8. Let X ∈X and τ ∈T . Then for all Q ∈Q:
essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Fτ] ∈L 1(Ω,F ,Q).
In particular
|essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Fτ]| <∞ a.s.
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Proof. Let X ∈X , τ ∈T and Q ∈Q. Then
EQ [|essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Fτ]|]É EQ [esssup
P∈Q
EP [|X ||Fτ]].
So if we are able to show that the second term is strictly less than infinity, the proof is
finished. In order to show this we show at first that the set C := {EP [|X ||Fτ] : P ∈Q} is
upward directed. For this purpose let R, R˜ ∈Q and define
A := {ER [|X ||Fτ]Ê ER˜ [|X ||Fτ]} ∈Fτ.
Then
ER [|X ||Fτ]∨ER˜ [|X ||Fτ]= 1AER [|X ||Fτ]+ 1AcER˜ [|X ||Fτ]
and Proposition A.1(ii) implies that there exists P˜ such that
EP˜ [|X ||Fτ]= 1AER [|X ||Fτ]+ 1AcER˜ [|X ||Fτ].
Hence C is upward directed and so there exists a nondecreasing sequence
(EP
n
[|X ||Fτ])n∈N in C with
lim
n→∞E
P n [|X ||Fτ]= esssup
P∈Q
EP [|X ||Fτ] a.s.
By the monotone convergence theorem of Levi and Proposition A.5 we conclude that
there exist Qn ∈Q, n ∈N, such that
EQ [|essinf
P∈Q
EP [X |Fτ]|]É EQ [esssup
P∈Q
EP [|X ||Fτ]]
= EQ [ lim
n→∞E
P n [|X ||Fτ]]
= lim
n→∞E
Q [EP
n
[|X ||Fτ]]
= lim
n→∞E
Qn [|X |]É sup
P∈Q
EP [|X |]<∞.
Although multiple prior conditional expectations are no longer linear, a lot of prop-
erties of classical conditional expectations carry over to the multiple prior case. Some
properties that we will use frequently are listed in the following proposition.
Proposition A.9. (Riedel 2009)
Let X ,Y ∈X and τ ∈T . Then the following properties hold.
(i) Monotonicity: X Ê Y a.s. implies:
Eτ(X )Ê Eτ(Y ).
(ii) Conditional homogeneity of degree 1: let Z Ê 0 be a boundedFτ-measurable ran-
dom variable. Then
Eτ(Z X )= ZEτ(X ).
(iii) Superadditivity:
Eτ(X +Y )Ê Eτ(X )+Eτ(Y ).
(iv) Conditional additivity: If Y isFτ-measurable, then
Eτ(X +Y )= Eτ(X )+Y .
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